http://www.myspace.com/dhlxstudios
Saturday, May 21, 2011
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Reference_class_forecasting
http://www.myspace.com/dhlxstudios
Reference class forecasting predicts the outcome of a planned action based on actual outcomes in a reference class of similar actions to that being forecast. The theories behind reference class forecasting were developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. The methodology and data needed for employing reference class forecasting in practice in policy, planning, and management were developed by Oxford professor Bent Flyvbjerg and the COWI consulting group in a joint effort. The theoretical work helped Kahneman win the Nobel Prize in Economics. Today, reference class forecasting has found widespread use in practice in both public and private sector policy and management.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979a, b) found that human judgment is generally optimistic due to overconfidence and insufficient consideration of distributional information about outcomes. Therefore, people tend to underestimate the costs, completion times, and risks of planned actions, whereas they tend to overestimate the benefits of those same actions. Such error is caused by actors taking an "inside view," where focus is on the constituents of the specific planned action instead of on the actual outcomes of similar ventures that have already been completed.
Kahneman and Tversky concluded that disregard of distributional information, that is, risk, is perhaps the major source of error in forecasting. On that basis they recommended that forecasters "should therefore make every effort to frame the forecasting problem so as to facilitate utilizing all the distributional information that is available" (Kahneman and Tversky 1979b, p. 316).
Using distributional information from previous ventures similar to the one being forecast is called taking an "outside view". Reference class forecasting is a method for taking an outside view on planned actions.
Reference class forecasting for a specific project involves the following three steps:
Identify a reference class of past, similar projects.
Establish a probability distribution for the selected reference class for the parameter that is being forecast.
Compare the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to establish the most likely outcome for the specific project.
Whereas Kahneman and Tversky developed the theories of reference class forecasting, Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) developed the method for its practical use in policy and planning. The first instance of reference class forecasting in practice is described in Flyvbjerg (2006). This was a forecast carried out in 2004 by the UK government of the projected capital costs for an extension of Edinburgh Trams. The promoter's forecast estimated a cost of £255 million. Taking all available distributional information into account, based on a reference class of comparable rail projects, the reference class forecast estimated a cost of £320 million. (In reality, although it is still not finished, projected costs now expected to exceed £600 million[1]) Since the Edinburgh forecast, reference class forecasting has been applied to numerous other projects in the UK, including the £15 (US$29) billion Crossrail project in London. After 2004, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland have also implemented various types of reference class forecasting.
In 2005, the American Planning Association (APA) endorsed reference class forecasting and recommended that planners should never rely solely on conventional forecasting techniques:
"APA encourages planners to use reference class forecasting in addition to traditional methods as a way to improve accuracy. The reference class forecasting method is beneficial for non-routine projects ... Planners should never rely solely on civil engineering technology as a way to generate project forecasts" (the American Planning Association 2005).
Before this, in 2001 (updated in 2006), AACE International (the Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering) included Estimate Validation as a distinct step in the recommended practice of Cost Estimating (Estimate Validation is equivalent to Reference class forecasting in that it calls for separate empirical-based evaluations to benchmark the base estimate):
"The estimate should be benchmarked or validated against or compared to historical experience and/or past estimates of the enterprise and of competitive enterprises to check its appropriateness, competitiveness, and to identify improvement opportunities...Validation examines the estimate from a different perspective and using different metrics than are used in estimate preparation." (AACE International 2006)
In the process industries (e.g., oil and gas, chemicals, mining, energy, etc. which tend to dominate AACE's membership), benchmarking (i.e., "outside view") of project cost estimates against the historical costs of completed projects of similar types, including probabilistic information, has a long history (Merrow 1990). These companies must make a profit from their asset investments and therefore cannot afford the biases in public and government sponsored infrastructure projects.
[edit] See also
Reference class problem
Benefit shortfall
Event chain methodology
Cost overrun
Optimism bias
Planning fallacy
Strategic misrepresentation
Forecasting
Base rate fallacy
Financial risk
[edit] References
^ Leask, David (19 June 2010). "Tram chiefs admit: we have no idea what final bill will be". The Herald. Retrieved 19 June 2010.
American Planning Association, 2005, "JAPA Article Calls on Planners to Help End Inaccuracies in Public Project Revenue Forecasting", news release, April 7.
Flyvbjerg, B., 2006, "From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right." Project Management Journal, vol. 37, no. 3, August, pp. 5-15.
Flyvbjerg, B., 2008, "Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice." European Planning Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January, pp. 3-21.
Flyvbjerg, B. and Cowi, 2004, Procedures for Dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning: Guidance Document (London: UK Department for Transport).
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979a, "Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk." Econometrica, 47, pp. 313-327
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979b, "Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures." In S. Makridakis and S. C. Wheelwright, Eds., Studies in the Management Sciences: Forecasting, 12 (Amsterdam: North Holland).
Lovallo, D. and Kahneman, D., 2003, "Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives' Decisions," Harvard Business Review, July, pp 56-63
AACE International, "Total Cost Management Framework, Section 7.3, Cost Estimating and Budgeting", 2006
Merrow, E. and Yarossi, M., "Assessing Project Cost and Schedule Risk", 1990 AACE Transactions. pp H.6.1-7
Reference class forecasting predicts the outcome of a planned action based on actual outcomes in a reference class of similar actions to that being forecast. The theories behind reference class forecasting were developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. The methodology and data needed for employing reference class forecasting in practice in policy, planning, and management were developed by Oxford professor Bent Flyvbjerg and the COWI consulting group in a joint effort. The theoretical work helped Kahneman win the Nobel Prize in Economics. Today, reference class forecasting has found widespread use in practice in both public and private sector policy and management.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979a, b) found that human judgment is generally optimistic due to overconfidence and insufficient consideration of distributional information about outcomes. Therefore, people tend to underestimate the costs, completion times, and risks of planned actions, whereas they tend to overestimate the benefits of those same actions. Such error is caused by actors taking an "inside view," where focus is on the constituents of the specific planned action instead of on the actual outcomes of similar ventures that have already been completed.
Kahneman and Tversky concluded that disregard of distributional information, that is, risk, is perhaps the major source of error in forecasting. On that basis they recommended that forecasters "should therefore make every effort to frame the forecasting problem so as to facilitate utilizing all the distributional information that is available" (Kahneman and Tversky 1979b, p. 316).
Using distributional information from previous ventures similar to the one being forecast is called taking an "outside view". Reference class forecasting is a method for taking an outside view on planned actions.
Reference class forecasting for a specific project involves the following three steps:
Identify a reference class of past, similar projects.
Establish a probability distribution for the selected reference class for the parameter that is being forecast.
Compare the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to establish the most likely outcome for the specific project.
Whereas Kahneman and Tversky developed the theories of reference class forecasting, Flyvbjerg and COWI (2004) developed the method for its practical use in policy and planning. The first instance of reference class forecasting in practice is described in Flyvbjerg (2006). This was a forecast carried out in 2004 by the UK government of the projected capital costs for an extension of Edinburgh Trams. The promoter's forecast estimated a cost of £255 million. Taking all available distributional information into account, based on a reference class of comparable rail projects, the reference class forecast estimated a cost of £320 million. (In reality, although it is still not finished, projected costs now expected to exceed £600 million[1]) Since the Edinburgh forecast, reference class forecasting has been applied to numerous other projects in the UK, including the £15 (US$29) billion Crossrail project in London. After 2004, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland have also implemented various types of reference class forecasting.
In 2005, the American Planning Association (APA) endorsed reference class forecasting and recommended that planners should never rely solely on conventional forecasting techniques:
"APA encourages planners to use reference class forecasting in addition to traditional methods as a way to improve accuracy. The reference class forecasting method is beneficial for non-routine projects ... Planners should never rely solely on civil engineering technology as a way to generate project forecasts" (the American Planning Association 2005).
Before this, in 2001 (updated in 2006), AACE International (the Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering) included Estimate Validation as a distinct step in the recommended practice of Cost Estimating (Estimate Validation is equivalent to Reference class forecasting in that it calls for separate empirical-based evaluations to benchmark the base estimate):
"The estimate should be benchmarked or validated against or compared to historical experience and/or past estimates of the enterprise and of competitive enterprises to check its appropriateness, competitiveness, and to identify improvement opportunities...Validation examines the estimate from a different perspective and using different metrics than are used in estimate preparation." (AACE International 2006)
In the process industries (e.g., oil and gas, chemicals, mining, energy, etc. which tend to dominate AACE's membership), benchmarking (i.e., "outside view") of project cost estimates against the historical costs of completed projects of similar types, including probabilistic information, has a long history (Merrow 1990). These companies must make a profit from their asset investments and therefore cannot afford the biases in public and government sponsored infrastructure projects.
[edit] See also
Reference class problem
Benefit shortfall
Event chain methodology
Cost overrun
Optimism bias
Planning fallacy
Strategic misrepresentation
Forecasting
Base rate fallacy
Financial risk
[edit] References
^ Leask, David (19 June 2010). "Tram chiefs admit: we have no idea what final bill will be". The Herald. Retrieved 19 June 2010.
American Planning Association, 2005, "JAPA Article Calls on Planners to Help End Inaccuracies in Public Project Revenue Forecasting", news release, April 7.
Flyvbjerg, B., 2006, "From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right." Project Management Journal, vol. 37, no. 3, August, pp. 5-15.
Flyvbjerg, B., 2008, "Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice." European Planning Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January, pp. 3-21.
Flyvbjerg, B. and Cowi, 2004, Procedures for Dealing with Optimism Bias in Transport Planning: Guidance Document (London: UK Department for Transport).
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979a, "Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk." Econometrica, 47, pp. 313-327
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979b, "Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures." In S. Makridakis and S. C. Wheelwright, Eds., Studies in the Management Sciences: Forecasting, 12 (Amsterdam: North Holland).
Lovallo, D. and Kahneman, D., 2003, "Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives' Decisions," Harvard Business Review, July, pp 56-63
AACE International, "Total Cost Management Framework, Section 7.3, Cost Estimating and Budgeting", 2006
Merrow, E. and Yarossi, M., "Assessing Project Cost and Schedule Risk", 1990 AACE Transactions. pp H.6.1-7
Self-perception_theory
http://www.myspace.com/dhlxstudios
Self-perception theory (SPT) is an account of attitude change developed by psychologist Daryl Bem.[1][2] It asserts that people develop their attitudes by observing their behaviour and concluding what attitudes must have caused them. The theory is counterintuitive in nature, as the conventional wisdom is that attitudes come prior to behaviors. Furthermore, the theory suggests that a person induces attitudes without accessing internal cognition and mood states.[3] The person reasons their own overt behaviors rationally in the same way they attempt to explain others’ behaviors.
Contents
[hide]
1 Original experiment on self-perception theory
2 Further evidence
3 Applications
3.1 Psychological therapy
3.2 Foot-in-the-door technique
4 Challenges and criticisms
5 Disproof of Self-Perception Theory?
6 Reviving self-perception theory: The Truce Experiment
7 See also
8 References
9 External links
[edit] Original experiment on self-perception theory
In an attempt to decide whether individuals induce their attitudes as observers without accessing their internal states, Bem used interpersonal simulations, in which an “observer-participant” is given a detailed description of one condition of a cognitive dissonance experiment. Subjects listened to a tape of a man enthusiastically describing a tedious peg-turning task. Some subjects were told that the man had been paid $20 for his testimonial and another group was told that he was paid $1. Those in the latter condition thought that the man must have enjoyed the task more than those in the $20 condition. The results obtained were similar to the original Festinger-Carlsmith experiment. Because the observers, who did not have access to the actors’ internal cognition and mood states, were able to infer the true attitude of the actors, it is possible that the actors themselves also arrive at their attitudes by looking at their own behavior from an observer’s standpoint.
[edit] Further evidence
There are numerous studies conducted by psychologists that support the self-perception theory, demonstrating that emotions do follow behaviors. For example, it is found that corresponding emotions (including liking, disliking, happiness, anger, etc.) were reported following from their overt behaviors, which had been manipulated by the experimenters.[4] These behaviors included making different facial expressions, gazes and postures. In the end of the experiment, subjects inferred and reported their affections and attitudes from their practiced behaviors despite the fact that they were told previously to act that way. These findings are consistent with the James-Lange theory of emotion.
Evidence for the self-perception theory has also been seen in real life situations. After teenagers participated in repeated and sustained volunteering services, their attitudes were demonstrated to have shifted to be more caring and considerate towards others.[5]
[edit] Applications
One useful application of the self-perception theory is in changing attitude, both therapeutically and in terms of persuasion.
[edit] Psychological therapy
Firstly, for therapies, self-perception theory holds a different view of psychological problems from the traditional perspectives which suggest that those problems come from the inner part of the clients. Instead, self-perception theory perspective suggests that people attribute their inner feelings or abilities from their external behaviors.[6] If those behaviors are maladjusted ones, people will attribute those maladjustments to their poor adapting abilities and thus suffer from the corresponding psychological problems. Thus, we can make use of this concept to treat clients with psychological problems that are resulted from maladjustments by guiding or giving suggestions to them to firstly change their behaviors and later the ‘problems’.
One of the most famous therapies making use of this concept is therapy for ‘Heterosocial Anxiety'.[7][8] In this case, the assumption is that an individual perceives that he or she has poor social skills because he/she has no dates. Experiments showed that males with heterosocial anxiety perceived less anxiety with females after several sessions of therapy in which they engaged in a 12-minute, purposefully biased dyadic social interactions with a separate female. From these apparently successful interactions, the males inferred that their heterosocial anxiety was reduced. This effect is shown to be quite long-lasting as the reduction in perceived heterosocial anxiety resulted in a significantly greater number of dates among subjects 6 months later.
[edit] Foot-in-the-door technique
Secondly, self-perception theory is an underlying mechanism for the effectiveness of many marketing or persuasive techniques. One typical example is the foot-in-the-door technique, which is a widely-used marketing technique for persuading target customers to buy products. The basic premise of this technique is that, once a person complies with a small request (e.g. filling in a short questionnaire), he/she will be more likely to comply with a more substantial request which is related to the original request (e.g. buying the related product).[9] [10] [11] [12] The idea is that the initial commitment on the small request will change one’s self image, therefore giving reasons for agreeing with the subsequent, larger request. It is because people observe their own behaviors (paying attention to and complying with the initial request) and the context in which they behave (no obvious incentive to do so), and thus infer they must have a preference for those products.
[edit] Challenges and criticisms
The self-perception theory was initially proposed as an alternative to explain the experimental findings of the cognitive dissonance theory, and there were debates as to whether people experience attitude changes as an effort to reduce dissonance or as a result of self-perception processes. Basing on the fact that the self-perception theory differs from the cognitive dissonance theory in that it does not hold that people experience a "negative drive state" called "dissonance" which they seek to relieve, the following experiment was carried out to compare the two theories under different conditions.
An early study on cognitive dissonance theory shows that people indeed experience arousal when their behavior is inconsistent with their previous attitude. Waterman[13] designed an experiment in which participants were asked to write an essay arguing against the position they agreed. Then they were asked immediately to perform a simple task and a difficult task and their performance in both tasks were assessed. It was found that they performed better in the simple task and worse in the difficult task, compared to those who had just written an essay corresponding to their true attitude. As indicated by social facilitation, enhanced performance in simple tasks and worsened performance in difficult tasks shows that arousal is produced by people when their behavior is inconsistent with their attitude. Therefore, the cognitive dissonance theory is evident in this case.
[edit] Disproof of Self-Perception Theory?
There was a time when it was debated whether or not dissonance or self perception was the valid mechanism behind attitude change. The chief difficulty was in finding an experiment where the two flexible theories would make distinctly different predictions. Some prominent social psychologists such as Anthony Greenwald thought it would be impossible to distinguish between the two theories.
Zanna and Cooper in 1974 conducted an experiment in which individuals were made to write a counter-attitudinal essay. They were divided into either a low choice or a high choice condition. They were also given a placebo; they were told the placebo would induce either tension, relaxation, or exert no effect.
Under low choice, all participants exhibited no attitude change, which would be predicted by both cognitive dissonance theory and self-perception theory.
Interestingly, under high choice, participants who were told the placebo would produce tension exhibited no attitude change, and participants who were told the placebo would produce relaxation demonstrated larger attitude change.
These results are not explainable by self-perception theory as arousal should have nothing to do with the mechanism underlying attitude change. Cognitive dissonance theory, however, was readily able to explain these results: if the participants could attribute their state of unpleasant arousal to the placebo, they wouldn't have to alter their attitude.
Thus, for a period of time, it seemed the debate between self-perception theory and cognitive dissonance had ended.
[edit] Reviving self-perception theory: The Truce Experiment
Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper conducted another experiment in 1977 that demonstrated that both cognitive dissonance and self-perception could co-exist.
In an experimental design similar to the previous one, another variable was manipulated: whether or not the stance of the counter-attitudinal essay fell in the latitude of acceptance or the latitude of rejection (see Social judgment theory). It appeared that when the stance of the essay fell into the latitude of rejection, the results favoured cognitive dissonance. However, when the essay fell in the latitude of acceptance, the results favoured self-perception theory.
Whether cognitive dissonance or self-perception is a more useful theory is a topic of considerable controversy and a large body of literature. There are some circumstances where either theory is preferred, but it is traditional to use the terminology of cognitive dissonance theory by default. The cognitive dissonance theory accounts attitude changes when people’s behaviors are inconsistent with their original attitudes which are clear and important to them; while the self-perception theory is used when those original attitudes are relatively ambiguous and less important. Studies have shown that in contrast to traditional belief, a large proportion of people’s attitudes are weak and vague. Thus, the self-perception theory is significant in interpreting one’s own attitudes, such as one’s assessment of one’s personality traits[14] [15] and whether one would cheat to achieve a goal. [16]
According to G. Jademyr and Yojiyfus, the perception of different aspect in the interpretending theory can be due to many factors, such as circumstances regarding dissonance and controversy. This can also be because of the balance-theory is transformed into the attitude towards account and dimensions.
[edit] See also
Outline of self
Overjustification effect
Self-schema
Social psychology (psychology)
[edit] References
^ Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena. Psychological Review, 74, 183-200.
^ Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-Perception Theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 6, pp.1-62). New York: Academic Press.
^ Robak, R. W., Ward, A., & Ostolaza, K. (2005). Development of a General Measure of Individuals’ Recognition of Their Self-Perception Processes. Psychology, 7, 337-344.
^ Laird, J. D. (2007). Feelings: The Perceptions of Self. New York: Oxford University Press.
^ Brunelle, J. P. (2001). The impact of community service on adolescent volunteers’ empathy, social responsibility, and concern for others. The Sciences and Engineering, 62, 2514.
^ Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, (6th ed.). New York, NY: Academic.
^ Haemmerlie, F. M., & Montgomery, R. L. (1982). Self-perception theory and unobtrusively biased interactions: A treatment for heterosocial anxiety. Journal of Counseling, Psychology, 29, 362-370.
^ Haemmerlie, F. M., & Montgomery, R. L. (1984). Purposefully biased interactions: Reducing heterosocial anxiety through self-perception theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 900-908.
^ Snyder, M., & Cunningham, M. R. (1975). To comply or not comply: testing the self-perception explanation of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 64–67.
^ Uranowitz, S. W. (1975). Helping and self-attributions: a field experiment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 852–854.
^ Seligman, C., Bush, M., & Kirsch, K. (1976). Relationship compliance in the foot-in-the-door paradigm and size of the first request. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 517–520.
^ Burger, J. M. (1999). The foot-in-the-door compliance procedure: a multiple-process analysis and review, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 303–325.
^ Waterman, C. K. (1969). The facilitating and interfering effects of cognitive dissonance on simple and complex paired associates learning tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 5, 31-42.
^ Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195-202.
^ Tice, D. M. (1993). Self-concept change and self-presentation: The looking glass self is also a magnifying glass. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 435-451.
^ Dienstbier, R. A., & Munter, P.O. (1971). Cheating as a function of the labeling of natural arousal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 208-213.
Gilovich, T., Keltner, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (2006). Social Psychology. New York: Norton & Company.
Bem, D. J. (1972). "Self-perception theory". In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social psychology, Vol. 6, 1-62. New York: Academic Press. Full text (PDF). Summary.
Self-perception theory (SPT) is an account of attitude change developed by psychologist Daryl Bem.[1][2] It asserts that people develop their attitudes by observing their behaviour and concluding what attitudes must have caused them. The theory is counterintuitive in nature, as the conventional wisdom is that attitudes come prior to behaviors. Furthermore, the theory suggests that a person induces attitudes without accessing internal cognition and mood states.[3] The person reasons their own overt behaviors rationally in the same way they attempt to explain others’ behaviors.
Contents
[hide]
1 Original experiment on self-perception theory
2 Further evidence
3 Applications
3.1 Psychological therapy
3.2 Foot-in-the-door technique
4 Challenges and criticisms
5 Disproof of Self-Perception Theory?
6 Reviving self-perception theory: The Truce Experiment
7 See also
8 References
9 External links
[edit] Original experiment on self-perception theory
In an attempt to decide whether individuals induce their attitudes as observers without accessing their internal states, Bem used interpersonal simulations, in which an “observer-participant” is given a detailed description of one condition of a cognitive dissonance experiment. Subjects listened to a tape of a man enthusiastically describing a tedious peg-turning task. Some subjects were told that the man had been paid $20 for his testimonial and another group was told that he was paid $1. Those in the latter condition thought that the man must have enjoyed the task more than those in the $20 condition. The results obtained were similar to the original Festinger-Carlsmith experiment. Because the observers, who did not have access to the actors’ internal cognition and mood states, were able to infer the true attitude of the actors, it is possible that the actors themselves also arrive at their attitudes by looking at their own behavior from an observer’s standpoint.
[edit] Further evidence
There are numerous studies conducted by psychologists that support the self-perception theory, demonstrating that emotions do follow behaviors. For example, it is found that corresponding emotions (including liking, disliking, happiness, anger, etc.) were reported following from their overt behaviors, which had been manipulated by the experimenters.[4] These behaviors included making different facial expressions, gazes and postures. In the end of the experiment, subjects inferred and reported their affections and attitudes from their practiced behaviors despite the fact that they were told previously to act that way. These findings are consistent with the James-Lange theory of emotion.
Evidence for the self-perception theory has also been seen in real life situations. After teenagers participated in repeated and sustained volunteering services, their attitudes were demonstrated to have shifted to be more caring and considerate towards others.[5]
[edit] Applications
One useful application of the self-perception theory is in changing attitude, both therapeutically and in terms of persuasion.
[edit] Psychological therapy
Firstly, for therapies, self-perception theory holds a different view of psychological problems from the traditional perspectives which suggest that those problems come from the inner part of the clients. Instead, self-perception theory perspective suggests that people attribute their inner feelings or abilities from their external behaviors.[6] If those behaviors are maladjusted ones, people will attribute those maladjustments to their poor adapting abilities and thus suffer from the corresponding psychological problems. Thus, we can make use of this concept to treat clients with psychological problems that are resulted from maladjustments by guiding or giving suggestions to them to firstly change their behaviors and later the ‘problems’.
One of the most famous therapies making use of this concept is therapy for ‘Heterosocial Anxiety'.[7][8] In this case, the assumption is that an individual perceives that he or she has poor social skills because he/she has no dates. Experiments showed that males with heterosocial anxiety perceived less anxiety with females after several sessions of therapy in which they engaged in a 12-minute, purposefully biased dyadic social interactions with a separate female. From these apparently successful interactions, the males inferred that their heterosocial anxiety was reduced. This effect is shown to be quite long-lasting as the reduction in perceived heterosocial anxiety resulted in a significantly greater number of dates among subjects 6 months later.
[edit] Foot-in-the-door technique
Secondly, self-perception theory is an underlying mechanism for the effectiveness of many marketing or persuasive techniques. One typical example is the foot-in-the-door technique, which is a widely-used marketing technique for persuading target customers to buy products. The basic premise of this technique is that, once a person complies with a small request (e.g. filling in a short questionnaire), he/she will be more likely to comply with a more substantial request which is related to the original request (e.g. buying the related product).[9] [10] [11] [12] The idea is that the initial commitment on the small request will change one’s self image, therefore giving reasons for agreeing with the subsequent, larger request. It is because people observe their own behaviors (paying attention to and complying with the initial request) and the context in which they behave (no obvious incentive to do so), and thus infer they must have a preference for those products.
[edit] Challenges and criticisms
The self-perception theory was initially proposed as an alternative to explain the experimental findings of the cognitive dissonance theory, and there were debates as to whether people experience attitude changes as an effort to reduce dissonance or as a result of self-perception processes. Basing on the fact that the self-perception theory differs from the cognitive dissonance theory in that it does not hold that people experience a "negative drive state" called "dissonance" which they seek to relieve, the following experiment was carried out to compare the two theories under different conditions.
An early study on cognitive dissonance theory shows that people indeed experience arousal when their behavior is inconsistent with their previous attitude. Waterman[13] designed an experiment in which participants were asked to write an essay arguing against the position they agreed. Then they were asked immediately to perform a simple task and a difficult task and their performance in both tasks were assessed. It was found that they performed better in the simple task and worse in the difficult task, compared to those who had just written an essay corresponding to their true attitude. As indicated by social facilitation, enhanced performance in simple tasks and worsened performance in difficult tasks shows that arousal is produced by people when their behavior is inconsistent with their attitude. Therefore, the cognitive dissonance theory is evident in this case.
[edit] Disproof of Self-Perception Theory?
There was a time when it was debated whether or not dissonance or self perception was the valid mechanism behind attitude change. The chief difficulty was in finding an experiment where the two flexible theories would make distinctly different predictions. Some prominent social psychologists such as Anthony Greenwald thought it would be impossible to distinguish between the two theories.
Zanna and Cooper in 1974 conducted an experiment in which individuals were made to write a counter-attitudinal essay. They were divided into either a low choice or a high choice condition. They were also given a placebo; they were told the placebo would induce either tension, relaxation, or exert no effect.
Under low choice, all participants exhibited no attitude change, which would be predicted by both cognitive dissonance theory and self-perception theory.
Interestingly, under high choice, participants who were told the placebo would produce tension exhibited no attitude change, and participants who were told the placebo would produce relaxation demonstrated larger attitude change.
These results are not explainable by self-perception theory as arousal should have nothing to do with the mechanism underlying attitude change. Cognitive dissonance theory, however, was readily able to explain these results: if the participants could attribute their state of unpleasant arousal to the placebo, they wouldn't have to alter their attitude.
Thus, for a period of time, it seemed the debate between self-perception theory and cognitive dissonance had ended.
[edit] Reviving self-perception theory: The Truce Experiment
Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper conducted another experiment in 1977 that demonstrated that both cognitive dissonance and self-perception could co-exist.
In an experimental design similar to the previous one, another variable was manipulated: whether or not the stance of the counter-attitudinal essay fell in the latitude of acceptance or the latitude of rejection (see Social judgment theory). It appeared that when the stance of the essay fell into the latitude of rejection, the results favoured cognitive dissonance. However, when the essay fell in the latitude of acceptance, the results favoured self-perception theory.
Whether cognitive dissonance or self-perception is a more useful theory is a topic of considerable controversy and a large body of literature. There are some circumstances where either theory is preferred, but it is traditional to use the terminology of cognitive dissonance theory by default. The cognitive dissonance theory accounts attitude changes when people’s behaviors are inconsistent with their original attitudes which are clear and important to them; while the self-perception theory is used when those original attitudes are relatively ambiguous and less important. Studies have shown that in contrast to traditional belief, a large proportion of people’s attitudes are weak and vague. Thus, the self-perception theory is significant in interpreting one’s own attitudes, such as one’s assessment of one’s personality traits[14] [15] and whether one would cheat to achieve a goal. [16]
According to G. Jademyr and Yojiyfus, the perception of different aspect in the interpretending theory can be due to many factors, such as circumstances regarding dissonance and controversy. This can also be because of the balance-theory is transformed into the attitude towards account and dimensions.
[edit] See also
Outline of self
Overjustification effect
Self-schema
Social psychology (psychology)
[edit] References
^ Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena. Psychological Review, 74, 183-200.
^ Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-Perception Theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 6, pp.1-62). New York: Academic Press.
^ Robak, R. W., Ward, A., & Ostolaza, K. (2005). Development of a General Measure of Individuals’ Recognition of Their Self-Perception Processes. Psychology, 7, 337-344.
^ Laird, J. D. (2007). Feelings: The Perceptions of Self. New York: Oxford University Press.
^ Brunelle, J. P. (2001). The impact of community service on adolescent volunteers’ empathy, social responsibility, and concern for others. The Sciences and Engineering, 62, 2514.
^ Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, (6th ed.). New York, NY: Academic.
^ Haemmerlie, F. M., & Montgomery, R. L. (1982). Self-perception theory and unobtrusively biased interactions: A treatment for heterosocial anxiety. Journal of Counseling, Psychology, 29, 362-370.
^ Haemmerlie, F. M., & Montgomery, R. L. (1984). Purposefully biased interactions: Reducing heterosocial anxiety through self-perception theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 900-908.
^ Snyder, M., & Cunningham, M. R. (1975). To comply or not comply: testing the self-perception explanation of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 64–67.
^ Uranowitz, S. W. (1975). Helping and self-attributions: a field experiment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 852–854.
^ Seligman, C., Bush, M., & Kirsch, K. (1976). Relationship compliance in the foot-in-the-door paradigm and size of the first request. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 517–520.
^ Burger, J. M. (1999). The foot-in-the-door compliance procedure: a multiple-process analysis and review, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 303–325.
^ Waterman, C. K. (1969). The facilitating and interfering effects of cognitive dissonance on simple and complex paired associates learning tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 5, 31-42.
^ Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195-202.
^ Tice, D. M. (1993). Self-concept change and self-presentation: The looking glass self is also a magnifying glass. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 435-451.
^ Dienstbier, R. A., & Munter, P.O. (1971). Cheating as a function of the labeling of natural arousal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 208-213.
Gilovich, T., Keltner, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (2006). Social Psychology. New York: Norton & Company.
Bem, D. J. (1972). "Self-perception theory". In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social psychology, Vol. 6, 1-62. New York: Academic Press. Full text (PDF). Summary.
List of cognitive biases - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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List of cognitive biases
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Cognitive biases)
Text document with red question mark.svg
This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations.
Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations where appropriate. (June 2010)
A cognitive bias is a pattern of deviation in judgment that occurs in particular situations. Implicit in the concept of a "pattern of deviation" is a standard of comparison; this may be the judgment of people outside those particular situations, or may be a set of independently verifiable facts. The existence of some of these cognitive biases has been verified empirically in the field of psychology.
Cognitive biases are instances of evolved mental behavior. Some are presumably adaptive, for example, because they lead to more effective actions in given contexts or enable faster decisions when faster decisions are of greater value. Others presumably result from a lack of appropriate mental mechanisms, or from the misapplication of a mechanism that is adaptive under different circumstances.
Cognitive bias is a general term that is used to describe many distortions in the human mind that are difficult to eliminate and that lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, or illogical interpretation.[1]
Contents
[hide]
1 Decision-making and behavioral biases
2 Biases in probability and belief
3 Social biases
4 Memory errors
5 Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases
6 Methods for dealing with cognitive biases
7 See also
8 Notes
9 References
[edit] Decision-making and behavioral biases
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Many of these biases are studied for how they affect belief formation, business decisions, and scientific research.
Anchoring – the common human tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor," on one trait or piece of information when making decisions.
Attentional Bias – implicit cognitive bias defined as the tendency of emotionally salient stimuli in one's environment to preferentially draw and hold attention.
Bandwagon effect – the tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or believe) the same. Related to groupthink and herd behavior.
Bias blind spot – the tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people.[2]
Choice-supportive bias – the tendency to remember one's choices as better than they actually were.
Confirmation bias – the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions.[3]
Congruence bias – the tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, in contrast to tests of possible alternative hypotheses.
Contrast effect – the enhancement or diminishing of a weight or other measurement when compared with a recently observed contrasting object.[4]
Denomination effect – the tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (e.g. coins) rather than large amounts (e.g. bills).[5]
Distinction bias – the tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.[6]
Endowment effect – "the fact that people often demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it".[7]
Experimenter's or Expectation bias – the tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and publish data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that appear to conflict with those expectations.[8]
Extraordinarity bias – the tendency to value an object more than others in the same category as a result of an extraordinarity of that object that does not, in itself, change the value.[citation needed]
Focusing effect – the tendency to place too much importance on one aspect of an event; causes error in accurately predicting the utility of a future outcome.[9]
Framing effect – drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how that information is presented.
Hostile media effect - the tendency to see a media report as being biased due to one's own strong partisan views.
Hyperbolic discounting – the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs, where the tendency increases the closer to the present both payoffs are.[10]
Illusion of control – the tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over other external events.[11]
Impact bias – the tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states.[12]
Information bias – the tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.[13]
Interloper effect – the tendency to value third party consultation as objective, confirming, and without motive. Also consultation paradox, the conclusion that solutions proposed by existing personnel within an organization are less likely to receive support than from those recruited for that purpose.
Irrational escalation – the phenomenon where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong.
Loss aversion – "the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it".[14] (see also Sunk cost effects and Endowment effect).
Mere exposure effect – the tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them.[15]
Money illusion – the tendency to concentrate on the nominal (face value) of money rather than its value in terms of purchasing power.[16]
Moral credential effect – the tendency of a track record of non-prejudice to increase subsequent prejudice.
Negativity bias – the tendency to pay more attention and give more weight to negative than positive experiences or other kinds of information.
Neglect of probability – the tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty.[17]
Normalcy bias – the refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster which has never happened before.
Omission bias – the tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful omissions (inactions).[18]
Outcome bias – the tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the quality of the decision at the time it was made.
Planning fallacy – the tendency to underestimate task-completion times.[12]
Post-purchase rationalization – the tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a purchase was a good value.
Pseudocertainty effect – the tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.[19]
Reactance – the urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice.
Restraint bias – the tendency to overestimate one's ability to show restraint in the face of temptation.
Selective perception – the tendency for expectations to affect perception.
Semmelweis reflex – the tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts an established paradigm.[20]
Social comparison bias – the tendency, when making hiring decisions, to favour potential candidates who don't compete with one's own particular strengths.[21]
Status quo bias – the tendency to like things to stay relatively the same (see also loss aversion, endowment effect, and system justification).[22][23]
Unit bias — the tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task or an item. Strong effects on the consumption of food in particular.[24]
Wishful thinking – the formation of beliefs and the making of decisions according to what is pleasing to imagine instead of by appeal to evidence or rationality.[25]
Zero-risk bias – preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk.
[edit] Biases in probability and belief
Many of these biases are often studied for how they affect business and economic decisions and how they affect experimental research.
Ambiguity effect – the tendency to avoid options for which missing information makes the probability seem "unknown."[26]
Anchoring effect – the tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor," on a past reference or on one trait or piece of information when making decisions (also called "insufficient adjustment").
Attentional bias – the tendency to neglect relevant data when making judgments of a correlation or association.
Authority bias – the tendency to value an ambiguous stimulus (e.g., an art performance) according to the opinion of someone who is seen as an authority on the topic.
Availability heuristic – estimating what is more likely by what is more available in memory, which is biased toward vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples.
Availability cascade – a self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or "repeat something long enough and it will become true").
Base rate neglect or Base rate fallacy – the tendency to base judgments on specifics, ignoring general statistical information.[27]
Belief bias – an effect where someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.[28]
Clustering illusion – the tendency to see patterns where actually none exist.
Conjunction fallacy – the tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than general ones.[29]
Forward Bias - the tendency to create models based on past data which are validated only against that past data.
Gambler's fallacy – the tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. Results from an erroneous conceptualization of the Law of large numbers. For example, "I've flipped heads with this coin five times consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than heads."
Hindsight bias – sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, the tendency to see past events as being predictable[30] at the time those events happened.
Illusory correlation – inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two events, either because of prejudice or selective processing of information.[31]
Observer-expectancy effect – when a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see also subject-expectancy effect).
Optimism bias – the tendency to be over-optimistic about the outcome of planned actions.[32]
Ostrich effect – ignoring an obvious (negative) situation.
Overconfidence effect – excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as "99% certain" turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.[33][34]
Positive outcome bias – the tendency of one to overestimate the probability of a favorable outcome coming to pass in a given situation (see also wishful thinking, optimism bias, and valence effect).
Pareidolia – a vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant, e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing hidden messages on records played in reverse.
Pessimism bias – the tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them.
Primacy effect – the tendency to weigh initial events more than subsequent events.[35]
Recency effect – the tendency to weigh recent events more than earlier events (see also peak-end rule).
Disregard of regression toward the mean – the tendency to expect extreme performance to continue.
Stereotyping – expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual.
Subadditivity effect – the tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts.
Subjective validation – perception that something is true if a subject's belief demands it to be true. Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences.
Well travelled road effect – underestimation of the duration taken to traverse oft-traveled routes and over-estimate the duration taken to traverse less familiar routes.
[edit] Social biases
Most of these biases are labeled as attributional biases.
Actor–observer bias – the tendency for explanations of other individuals' behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see also Fundamental attribution error). However, this is coupled with the opposite tendency for the self in that explanations for our own behaviors overemphasize the influence of our situation and underemphasize the influence of our own personality.
Dunning–Kruger effect – a twofold bias. On one hand the lack of metacognitive ability deludes people, who overrate their capabilities. On the other hand, skilled people underrate their abilities, as they assume the others have a similar understanding.[36]
Egocentric bias – occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint action than an outside observer would.
Forer effect (aka Barnum effect) – the tendency to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. For example, horoscopes.
False consensus effect – the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them.[37]
Fundamental attribution error – the tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and power of situational influences on the same behavior (see also actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[38]
Halo effect – the tendency for a person's positive or negative traits to "spill over" from one area of their personality to another in others' perceptions of them (see also physical attractiveness stereotype).[39]
Herd instinct – common tendency to adopt the opinions and follow the behaviors of the majority to feel safer and to avoid conflict.
Illusion of asymmetric insight – people perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them.[40]
Illusion of transparency – people overestimate others' ability to know them, and they also overestimate their ability to know others.
Illusory superiority – overestimating one's desirable qualities, and underestimating undesirable qualities, relative to other people. (Also known as "Lake Wobegon effect," "better-than-average effect," or "superiority bias").[41]
Ingroup bias – the tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups.
Just-world phenomenon – the tendency for people to believe that the world is just and therefore people "get what they deserve."
Moral luck – the tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based on the outcome of an event rather than the intention
Outgroup homogeneity bias – individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied than members of other groups.[42]
Projection bias – the tendency to unconsciously assume that others (or one's future selves) share one's current emotional states, thoughts and values.[43]
Self-serving bias – the tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also group-serving bias).[44]
System justification – the tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest. (See also status quo bias.)
Trait ascription bias – the tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.
Ultimate attribution error – similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely to make an internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals within the group.
[edit] Memory errors
Further information: Memory bias
Consistency bias – incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behavior as resembling present attitudes and behavior.
Cryptomnesia – a form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination.
Egocentric bias – recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g. remembering one's exam grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as being bigger than it was.
False memory – confusion of imagination with memory, or the confusion of true memories with false memories.
Hindsight bias – filtering memory of past events through present knowledge, so that those events look more predictable than they actually were; also known as the "I-knew-it-all-along effect."[30]
Reminiscence bump – the effect that people tend to recall more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than from other lifetime periods.
Rosy retrospection – the tendency to rate past events more positively than they had actually rated them when the event occurred.
Self-serving bias – perceiving oneself responsible for desirable outcomes but not responsible for undesirable ones.
Suggestibility – a form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for memory.
Telescoping effect – the effect that recent events appear to have occurred more remotely and remote events appear to have occurred more recently.
Von Restorff effect – the tendency for an item that "stands out like a sore thumb" to be more likely to be remembered than other items.
[edit] Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases
Bounded rationality – limits on optimization and rationality
Attribute substitution – making a complex, difficult judgement by unconsciously substituting an easier judgement[45]
Attribution theory, especially:
Salience
Cognitive dissonance, and related:
Impression management
Self-perception theory
Heuristics, including:
Availability heuristic – estimating what is more likely by what is more available in memory, which is biased toward vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples[31]
Representativeness heuristic – judging probabilities on the basis of resemblance[31]
Affect heuristic – basing a decision on an emotional reaction rather than a calculation of risks and benefits[46]
Introspection illusion
Adaptive bias
Misinterpretations or misuse of statistics.
[edit] Methods for dealing with cognitive biases
Reference class forecasting was developed by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Bent Flyvbjerg to eliminate or reduce the impact of cognitive biases on decision making.[47]
[edit] See also
Psychology portal
Thinking portal
Affective forecasting
Attribution theory
Black swan theory
Cognitive distortion
Cross-race effect
Dysrationalia
Groupthink
List of common misconceptions
List of fallacies
List of memory biases
Lists of thinking-related topics
List of topics related to public relations and propaganda
Logical fallacy
Ludic fallacy
Media bias
Self-deception
System justification
Systematic bias
[edit] Notes
^ Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1972), "Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness", Cognitive Psychology 3: 430–454, doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3.
^ Pronin, Emily; Matthew B. Kugler (July 2007), "Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (Elsevier) 43 (4): 565–578, doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011, ISSN 0022-1031.
^ Oswald, Margit E.; Grosjean, Stefan (2004), "Confirmation Bias", in Pohl, Rüdiger F., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press, pp. 79–96, ISBN 9781841693514, OCLC 55124398
^ Plous 1993, pp. 38–41
^ Why We Spend Coins Faster Than Bills by Chana Joffe-Walt. All Things Considered, 12 May 2009.
^ Hsee, Christopher K.; Zhang, Jiao (2004), "Distinction bias: Misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86 (5): 680–695, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.680, PMID 15161394
^ (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1991, p. 193) Richard Thaler coined the term "endowment effect."
^ M. Jeng, "A selected history of expectation bias in physics", American Journal of Physics 74 578-583 (2006)
^ Kahneman, Daniel; Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, Arthur A. Stone (2006-06-30), "Would you be happier if you were richer? A focusing illusion", Science 312 (5782): 1908–10, doi:10.1126/science.1129688, PMID 16809528
^ Hardman 2009, p. 110
^ Thompson, Suzanne C. (1999), "Illusions of Control: How We Overestimate Our Personal Influence", Current Directions in Psychological Science (Association for Psychological Science) 8 (6): 187–190, ISSN 0963–7214
^ a b Sanna, Lawrence J.; Schwarz, Norbert (2004), "Integrating Temporal Biases: The Interplay of Focal Thoughts and Accessibility Experiences", Psychological Science (American Psychological Society) 15 (7): 474–481, doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00704.x, PMID 15200632
^ Baron 1994, pp. 258–259
^ (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1991, p. 193) Daniel Kahneman, together with Amos Tversky, coined the term "loss aversion."
^ Bornstein, Robert F.; Crave-Lemley, Catherine (2004), "Mere exposure effect", in Pohl, Rüdiger F., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press, pp. 215–234, ISBN 9781841693514, OCLC 55124398
^ Shafir, Eldar; Diamond, Peter; Tversky, Amos (2000), "Money Illusion", Choices, values, and frames, Cambridge University Press, pp. 335–355, ISBN 9780521627498
^ Baron 1994, p. 353
^ Baron 1994, p. 386
^ Hardman 2009, p. 137
^ Edwards, W. (1968). Conservatism in human information processing. In: B. Kleinmutz (Ed.), Formal Representation of Human Judgment. (pp. 17-52). New York: John Wiley and Sons.
^ Stephen M. Garciaa, Hyunjin Song and Abraham Tesser (November 2010), "Tainted recommendations: The social comparison bias", Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 113 (2): 97–101, doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.06.002, ISSN 07495978, Lay summary (2010-10-30).
^ Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1991, p. 193
^ Baron 1994, p. 382
^ "Penn Psychologists Believe 'Unit Bias' Determines The Acceptable Amount To Eat". ScienceDaily (Nov. 21, 2005)
^ Baron 1994, p. 44
^ Baron 1994, p. 372
^ Baron 1994, pp. 224–228
^ Klauer, K. C.; J. Musch, B. Naumer (2000), "On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning", Psychological Review 107 (4): 852–884, doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.4.852, PMID 11089409
^ Fisk, John E. (2004), "Conjunction fallacy", in Pohl, Rüdiger F., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press, pp. 23–42, ISBN 9781841693514, OCLC 55124398
^ a b Pohl, Rüdiger F. (2004), "Hindsight Bias", in Pohl, Rüdiger F., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press, pp. 363–378, ISBN 9781841693514, OCLC 55124398
^ a b c Tversky, Amos; Daniel Kahneman (September 27, 1974), "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science) 185 (4157): 1124–1131, doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124, PMID 17835457
^ Hardman 2009, p. 104
^ Hoffrage, Ulrich (2004), "Overconfidence", in Rüdiger Pohl, Cognitive Illusions: a handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory, Psychology Press, ISBN 978-1-84169-351-4
^ Sutherland 2007, pp. 172–178
^ Baron 1994, p. 283
^ Kruger, Justin; David Dunning (1999). "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 (6): 1121–34. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121. PMID 10626367.
^ Marks, Gary; Miller, Norman (1987), "Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review", Psychological Bulletin (American Psychological Association) 102 (1): 72–90, doi:10.1037/0033-2909.102.1.72
^ Sutherland 2007, pp. 138–139
^ Baron 1994, p. 275
^ Pronin, E.; Kruger, J.; Savitsky, K.; Ross, L. (2001), "You don't know me, but I know you: the illusion of asymmetric insight", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (4): 639–656, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.639, PMID 11642351
^ Hoorens, Vera (1993), "Self-enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison", European Review of Social Psychology (Psychology Press) 4 (1): 113–139, doi:10.1080/14792779343000040.
^ Plous 2006, p. 206
^ Hsee, Christopher K.; Reid Hastie (2006), "Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy?", Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (1): 31–37, doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.11.007, PMID 16318925.
^ Plous 2006, p. 185
^ Kahneman, Daniel; Shane Frederick (2002), "Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment", in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49–81, ISBN 9780521796798, OCLC 47364085
^ Slovic, Paul; Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, Donald G. MacGregor (2002), "The Affect Heuristic", in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge University Press, pp. 397–420, ISBN 0521796792
^ Flyvbjerg, B., 2008, "Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice." European Planning Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January, pp. 3-21.
[edit] References
Baron, Jonathan (1994), Thinking and deciding (2nd ed.), Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-43732-6
Baron, Jonathan (2000), Thinking and deciding (3rd ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-65030-5
Bishop, Michael A.; J.D. Trout (2004), Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-516229-3
Gilovich, Thomas (1993), How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life, New York: The Free Press, ISBN 0-02-911706-2
Gilovich, Thomas; Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman (2002), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-79679-2
Greenwald, A. (1980), "The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History", American Psychologist (American Psychological Association) 35 (7), ISSN 0003-066X
Hardman, David (2009), Judgment and decision making: psychological perspectives, Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN 9781405123983
Kahneman, Daniel; Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky (1982), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-28414-7
Kahneman, Daniel; Knetsch, Jack L.; Thaler, Richard H. (1991), "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias", The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association) 5 (1): 193–206
Plous, Scott (1993), The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, New York: McGraw-Hill, ISBN 0-07-050477-6
Schacter, Daniel L. (1999), "The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights From Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience", American Psychologist (American Psychological Association) 54 (3): 182–203, doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.3.182, ISSN 0003-066X, PMID 10199218
Sutherland, Stuart (2007), Irrationality, Pinter & Martin, ISBN 978-1-905177-07-3
Tetlock, Philip E. (2005), Expert Political Judgment: how good is it? how can we know?, Princeton: Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-12302-8
Virine, L.; M. Trumper (2007), Project Decisions: The Art and Science, Vienna, VA: Management Concepts, ISBN 978-1567262179
List of cognitive biases
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Cognitive biases)
Text document with red question mark.svg
This article includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations.
Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations where appropriate. (June 2010)
A cognitive bias is a pattern of deviation in judgment that occurs in particular situations. Implicit in the concept of a "pattern of deviation" is a standard of comparison; this may be the judgment of people outside those particular situations, or may be a set of independently verifiable facts. The existence of some of these cognitive biases has been verified empirically in the field of psychology.
Cognitive biases are instances of evolved mental behavior. Some are presumably adaptive, for example, because they lead to more effective actions in given contexts or enable faster decisions when faster decisions are of greater value. Others presumably result from a lack of appropriate mental mechanisms, or from the misapplication of a mechanism that is adaptive under different circumstances.
Cognitive bias is a general term that is used to describe many distortions in the human mind that are difficult to eliminate and that lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, or illogical interpretation.[1]
Contents
[hide]
1 Decision-making and behavioral biases
2 Biases in probability and belief
3 Social biases
4 Memory errors
5 Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases
6 Methods for dealing with cognitive biases
7 See also
8 Notes
9 References
[edit] Decision-making and behavioral biases
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It has been suggested that Buyer decision processes#Cognitive and personal biases in decision making be merged into this article or section. (Discuss)
Many of these biases are studied for how they affect belief formation, business decisions, and scientific research.
Anchoring – the common human tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor," on one trait or piece of information when making decisions.
Attentional Bias – implicit cognitive bias defined as the tendency of emotionally salient stimuli in one's environment to preferentially draw and hold attention.
Bandwagon effect – the tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or believe) the same. Related to groupthink and herd behavior.
Bias blind spot – the tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people.[2]
Choice-supportive bias – the tendency to remember one's choices as better than they actually were.
Confirmation bias – the tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions.[3]
Congruence bias – the tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, in contrast to tests of possible alternative hypotheses.
Contrast effect – the enhancement or diminishing of a weight or other measurement when compared with a recently observed contrasting object.[4]
Denomination effect – the tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (e.g. coins) rather than large amounts (e.g. bills).[5]
Distinction bias – the tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.[6]
Endowment effect – "the fact that people often demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it".[7]
Experimenter's or Expectation bias – the tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and publish data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that appear to conflict with those expectations.[8]
Extraordinarity bias – the tendency to value an object more than others in the same category as a result of an extraordinarity of that object that does not, in itself, change the value.[citation needed]
Focusing effect – the tendency to place too much importance on one aspect of an event; causes error in accurately predicting the utility of a future outcome.[9]
Framing effect – drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how that information is presented.
Hostile media effect - the tendency to see a media report as being biased due to one's own strong partisan views.
Hyperbolic discounting – the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs, where the tendency increases the closer to the present both payoffs are.[10]
Illusion of control – the tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over other external events.[11]
Impact bias – the tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states.[12]
Information bias – the tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.[13]
Interloper effect – the tendency to value third party consultation as objective, confirming, and without motive. Also consultation paradox, the conclusion that solutions proposed by existing personnel within an organization are less likely to receive support than from those recruited for that purpose.
Irrational escalation – the phenomenon where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong.
Loss aversion – "the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it".[14] (see also Sunk cost effects and Endowment effect).
Mere exposure effect – the tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them.[15]
Money illusion – the tendency to concentrate on the nominal (face value) of money rather than its value in terms of purchasing power.[16]
Moral credential effect – the tendency of a track record of non-prejudice to increase subsequent prejudice.
Negativity bias – the tendency to pay more attention and give more weight to negative than positive experiences or other kinds of information.
Neglect of probability – the tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty.[17]
Normalcy bias – the refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster which has never happened before.
Omission bias – the tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful omissions (inactions).[18]
Outcome bias – the tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the quality of the decision at the time it was made.
Planning fallacy – the tendency to underestimate task-completion times.[12]
Post-purchase rationalization – the tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a purchase was a good value.
Pseudocertainty effect – the tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.[19]
Reactance – the urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice.
Restraint bias – the tendency to overestimate one's ability to show restraint in the face of temptation.
Selective perception – the tendency for expectations to affect perception.
Semmelweis reflex – the tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts an established paradigm.[20]
Social comparison bias – the tendency, when making hiring decisions, to favour potential candidates who don't compete with one's own particular strengths.[21]
Status quo bias – the tendency to like things to stay relatively the same (see also loss aversion, endowment effect, and system justification).[22][23]
Unit bias — the tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task or an item. Strong effects on the consumption of food in particular.[24]
Wishful thinking – the formation of beliefs and the making of decisions according to what is pleasing to imagine instead of by appeal to evidence or rationality.[25]
Zero-risk bias – preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk.
[edit] Biases in probability and belief
Many of these biases are often studied for how they affect business and economic decisions and how they affect experimental research.
Ambiguity effect – the tendency to avoid options for which missing information makes the probability seem "unknown."[26]
Anchoring effect – the tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor," on a past reference or on one trait or piece of information when making decisions (also called "insufficient adjustment").
Attentional bias – the tendency to neglect relevant data when making judgments of a correlation or association.
Authority bias – the tendency to value an ambiguous stimulus (e.g., an art performance) according to the opinion of someone who is seen as an authority on the topic.
Availability heuristic – estimating what is more likely by what is more available in memory, which is biased toward vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples.
Availability cascade – a self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or "repeat something long enough and it will become true").
Base rate neglect or Base rate fallacy – the tendency to base judgments on specifics, ignoring general statistical information.[27]
Belief bias – an effect where someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.[28]
Clustering illusion – the tendency to see patterns where actually none exist.
Conjunction fallacy – the tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than general ones.[29]
Forward Bias - the tendency to create models based on past data which are validated only against that past data.
Gambler's fallacy – the tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. Results from an erroneous conceptualization of the Law of large numbers. For example, "I've flipped heads with this coin five times consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than heads."
Hindsight bias – sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, the tendency to see past events as being predictable[30] at the time those events happened.
Illusory correlation – inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two events, either because of prejudice or selective processing of information.[31]
Observer-expectancy effect – when a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see also subject-expectancy effect).
Optimism bias – the tendency to be over-optimistic about the outcome of planned actions.[32]
Ostrich effect – ignoring an obvious (negative) situation.
Overconfidence effect – excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as "99% certain" turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.[33][34]
Positive outcome bias – the tendency of one to overestimate the probability of a favorable outcome coming to pass in a given situation (see also wishful thinking, optimism bias, and valence effect).
Pareidolia – a vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant, e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing hidden messages on records played in reverse.
Pessimism bias – the tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them.
Primacy effect – the tendency to weigh initial events more than subsequent events.[35]
Recency effect – the tendency to weigh recent events more than earlier events (see also peak-end rule).
Disregard of regression toward the mean – the tendency to expect extreme performance to continue.
Stereotyping – expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual.
Subadditivity effect – the tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts.
Subjective validation – perception that something is true if a subject's belief demands it to be true. Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences.
Well travelled road effect – underestimation of the duration taken to traverse oft-traveled routes and over-estimate the duration taken to traverse less familiar routes.
[edit] Social biases
Most of these biases are labeled as attributional biases.
Actor–observer bias – the tendency for explanations of other individuals' behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see also Fundamental attribution error). However, this is coupled with the opposite tendency for the self in that explanations for our own behaviors overemphasize the influence of our situation and underemphasize the influence of our own personality.
Dunning–Kruger effect – a twofold bias. On one hand the lack of metacognitive ability deludes people, who overrate their capabilities. On the other hand, skilled people underrate their abilities, as they assume the others have a similar understanding.[36]
Egocentric bias – occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint action than an outside observer would.
Forer effect (aka Barnum effect) – the tendency to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. For example, horoscopes.
False consensus effect – the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them.[37]
Fundamental attribution error – the tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and power of situational influences on the same behavior (see also actor-observer bias, group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[38]
Halo effect – the tendency for a person's positive or negative traits to "spill over" from one area of their personality to another in others' perceptions of them (see also physical attractiveness stereotype).[39]
Herd instinct – common tendency to adopt the opinions and follow the behaviors of the majority to feel safer and to avoid conflict.
Illusion of asymmetric insight – people perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them.[40]
Illusion of transparency – people overestimate others' ability to know them, and they also overestimate their ability to know others.
Illusory superiority – overestimating one's desirable qualities, and underestimating undesirable qualities, relative to other people. (Also known as "Lake Wobegon effect," "better-than-average effect," or "superiority bias").[41]
Ingroup bias – the tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups.
Just-world phenomenon – the tendency for people to believe that the world is just and therefore people "get what they deserve."
Moral luck – the tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based on the outcome of an event rather than the intention
Outgroup homogeneity bias – individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied than members of other groups.[42]
Projection bias – the tendency to unconsciously assume that others (or one's future selves) share one's current emotional states, thoughts and values.[43]
Self-serving bias – the tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also group-serving bias).[44]
System justification – the tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest. (See also status quo bias.)
Trait ascription bias – the tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.
Ultimate attribution error – similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely to make an internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals within the group.
[edit] Memory errors
Further information: Memory bias
Consistency bias – incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behavior as resembling present attitudes and behavior.
Cryptomnesia – a form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination.
Egocentric bias – recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g. remembering one's exam grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as being bigger than it was.
False memory – confusion of imagination with memory, or the confusion of true memories with false memories.
Hindsight bias – filtering memory of past events through present knowledge, so that those events look more predictable than they actually were; also known as the "I-knew-it-all-along effect."[30]
Reminiscence bump – the effect that people tend to recall more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than from other lifetime periods.
Rosy retrospection – the tendency to rate past events more positively than they had actually rated them when the event occurred.
Self-serving bias – perceiving oneself responsible for desirable outcomes but not responsible for undesirable ones.
Suggestibility – a form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for memory.
Telescoping effect – the effect that recent events appear to have occurred more remotely and remote events appear to have occurred more recently.
Von Restorff effect – the tendency for an item that "stands out like a sore thumb" to be more likely to be remembered than other items.
[edit] Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases
Bounded rationality – limits on optimization and rationality
Attribute substitution – making a complex, difficult judgement by unconsciously substituting an easier judgement[45]
Attribution theory, especially:
Salience
Cognitive dissonance, and related:
Impression management
Self-perception theory
Heuristics, including:
Availability heuristic – estimating what is more likely by what is more available in memory, which is biased toward vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples[31]
Representativeness heuristic – judging probabilities on the basis of resemblance[31]
Affect heuristic – basing a decision on an emotional reaction rather than a calculation of risks and benefits[46]
Introspection illusion
Adaptive bias
Misinterpretations or misuse of statistics.
[edit] Methods for dealing with cognitive biases
Reference class forecasting was developed by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Bent Flyvbjerg to eliminate or reduce the impact of cognitive biases on decision making.[47]
[edit] See also
Psychology portal
Thinking portal
Affective forecasting
Attribution theory
Black swan theory
Cognitive distortion
Cross-race effect
Dysrationalia
Groupthink
List of common misconceptions
List of fallacies
List of memory biases
Lists of thinking-related topics
List of topics related to public relations and propaganda
Logical fallacy
Ludic fallacy
Media bias
Self-deception
System justification
Systematic bias
[edit] Notes
^ Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A. (1972), "Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness", Cognitive Psychology 3: 430–454, doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3.
^ Pronin, Emily; Matthew B. Kugler (July 2007), "Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (Elsevier) 43 (4): 565–578, doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011, ISSN 0022-1031.
^ Oswald, Margit E.; Grosjean, Stefan (2004), "Confirmation Bias", in Pohl, Rüdiger F., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press, pp. 79–96, ISBN 9781841693514, OCLC 55124398
^ Plous 1993, pp. 38–41
^ Why We Spend Coins Faster Than Bills by Chana Joffe-Walt. All Things Considered, 12 May 2009.
^ Hsee, Christopher K.; Zhang, Jiao (2004), "Distinction bias: Misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86 (5): 680–695, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.680, PMID 15161394
^ (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1991, p. 193) Richard Thaler coined the term "endowment effect."
^ M. Jeng, "A selected history of expectation bias in physics", American Journal of Physics 74 578-583 (2006)
^ Kahneman, Daniel; Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, Arthur A. Stone (2006-06-30), "Would you be happier if you were richer? A focusing illusion", Science 312 (5782): 1908–10, doi:10.1126/science.1129688, PMID 16809528
^ Hardman 2009, p. 110
^ Thompson, Suzanne C. (1999), "Illusions of Control: How We Overestimate Our Personal Influence", Current Directions in Psychological Science (Association for Psychological Science) 8 (6): 187–190, ISSN 0963–7214
^ a b Sanna, Lawrence J.; Schwarz, Norbert (2004), "Integrating Temporal Biases: The Interplay of Focal Thoughts and Accessibility Experiences", Psychological Science (American Psychological Society) 15 (7): 474–481, doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00704.x, PMID 15200632
^ Baron 1994, pp. 258–259
^ (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1991, p. 193) Daniel Kahneman, together with Amos Tversky, coined the term "loss aversion."
^ Bornstein, Robert F.; Crave-Lemley, Catherine (2004), "Mere exposure effect", in Pohl, Rüdiger F., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press, pp. 215–234, ISBN 9781841693514, OCLC 55124398
^ Shafir, Eldar; Diamond, Peter; Tversky, Amos (2000), "Money Illusion", Choices, values, and frames, Cambridge University Press, pp. 335–355, ISBN 9780521627498
^ Baron 1994, p. 353
^ Baron 1994, p. 386
^ Hardman 2009, p. 137
^ Edwards, W. (1968). Conservatism in human information processing. In: B. Kleinmutz (Ed.), Formal Representation of Human Judgment. (pp. 17-52). New York: John Wiley and Sons.
^ Stephen M. Garciaa, Hyunjin Song and Abraham Tesser (November 2010), "Tainted recommendations: The social comparison bias", Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 113 (2): 97–101, doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.06.002, ISSN 07495978, Lay summary (2010-10-30).
^ Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1991, p. 193
^ Baron 1994, p. 382
^ "Penn Psychologists Believe 'Unit Bias' Determines The Acceptable Amount To Eat". ScienceDaily (Nov. 21, 2005)
^ Baron 1994, p. 44
^ Baron 1994, p. 372
^ Baron 1994, pp. 224–228
^ Klauer, K. C.; J. Musch, B. Naumer (2000), "On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning", Psychological Review 107 (4): 852–884, doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.4.852, PMID 11089409
^ Fisk, John E. (2004), "Conjunction fallacy", in Pohl, Rüdiger F., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press, pp. 23–42, ISBN 9781841693514, OCLC 55124398
^ a b Pohl, Rüdiger F. (2004), "Hindsight Bias", in Pohl, Rüdiger F., Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory, Hove, UK: Psychology Press, pp. 363–378, ISBN 9781841693514, OCLC 55124398
^ a b c Tversky, Amos; Daniel Kahneman (September 27, 1974), "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science) 185 (4157): 1124–1131, doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124, PMID 17835457
^ Hardman 2009, p. 104
^ Hoffrage, Ulrich (2004), "Overconfidence", in Rüdiger Pohl, Cognitive Illusions: a handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory, Psychology Press, ISBN 978-1-84169-351-4
^ Sutherland 2007, pp. 172–178
^ Baron 1994, p. 283
^ Kruger, Justin; David Dunning (1999). "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 (6): 1121–34. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121. PMID 10626367.
^ Marks, Gary; Miller, Norman (1987), "Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review", Psychological Bulletin (American Psychological Association) 102 (1): 72–90, doi:10.1037/0033-2909.102.1.72
^ Sutherland 2007, pp. 138–139
^ Baron 1994, p. 275
^ Pronin, E.; Kruger, J.; Savitsky, K.; Ross, L. (2001), "You don't know me, but I know you: the illusion of asymmetric insight", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (4): 639–656, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.639, PMID 11642351
^ Hoorens, Vera (1993), "Self-enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison", European Review of Social Psychology (Psychology Press) 4 (1): 113–139, doi:10.1080/14792779343000040.
^ Plous 2006, p. 206
^ Hsee, Christopher K.; Reid Hastie (2006), "Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy?", Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (1): 31–37, doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.11.007, PMID 16318925.
^ Plous 2006, p. 185
^ Kahneman, Daniel; Shane Frederick (2002), "Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment", in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49–81, ISBN 9780521796798, OCLC 47364085
^ Slovic, Paul; Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, Donald G. MacGregor (2002), "The Affect Heuristic", in Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge University Press, pp. 397–420, ISBN 0521796792
^ Flyvbjerg, B., 2008, "Curbing Optimism Bias and Strategic Misrepresentation in Planning: Reference Class Forecasting in Practice." European Planning Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January, pp. 3-21.
[edit] References
Baron, Jonathan (1994), Thinking and deciding (2nd ed.), Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-43732-6
Baron, Jonathan (2000), Thinking and deciding (3rd ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-65030-5
Bishop, Michael A.; J.D. Trout (2004), Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-516229-3
Gilovich, Thomas (1993), How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life, New York: The Free Press, ISBN 0-02-911706-2
Gilovich, Thomas; Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman (2002), Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-79679-2
Greenwald, A. (1980), "The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History", American Psychologist (American Psychological Association) 35 (7), ISSN 0003-066X
Hardman, David (2009), Judgment and decision making: psychological perspectives, Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN 9781405123983
Kahneman, Daniel; Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky (1982), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-28414-7
Kahneman, Daniel; Knetsch, Jack L.; Thaler, Richard H. (1991), "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias", The Journal of Economic Perspectives (American Economic Association) 5 (1): 193–206
Plous, Scott (1993), The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, New York: McGraw-Hill, ISBN 0-07-050477-6
Schacter, Daniel L. (1999), "The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights From Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience", American Psychologist (American Psychological Association) 54 (3): 182–203, doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.3.182, ISSN 0003-066X, PMID 10199218
Sutherland, Stuart (2007), Irrationality, Pinter & Martin, ISBN 978-1-905177-07-3
Tetlock, Philip E. (2005), Expert Political Judgment: how good is it? how can we know?, Princeton: Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-12302-8
Virine, L.; M. Trumper (2007), Project Decisions: The Art and Science, Vienna, VA: Management Concepts, ISBN 978-1567262179
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